Last Updated on April 22, 2020 by LawEuro
Information Note on the Court’s case-law 237
February 2020
Y.I. v. Russia – 68868/14
Judgment 25.2.2020 [Section III]
Article 8
Article 8-1
Respect for family life
Drug addict on treatment disproportionately deprived of parental authority over her children who were not neglected or in danger, of which the two youngest placed in public care: violation
Facts – The applicant was deprived of parental authority in respect of her three children and the two youngest were placed in public care. The domestic courts referred to the fact that the mother was a drug addict and unemployed and decided that it would be dangerous to leave the children in her care. Her appeals against this decision were unsuccessful.
Law – Article 8: Depriving the applicant of her parental authority in respect of her children had constituted an interference with her right to respect for family life. That interference was in accordance with law and had pursued the aim of protecting the rights of the applicant’s children.
The children’s removal and initial placement in public care at the beginning of the criminal proceedings against the applicant on suspicion of her involvement in drug trafficking had been justified, because she had been intoxicated on the date in question, had suffered from withdrawal symptoms on the following days, and had clearly been unable to take care of her children. It did not follow, however, that that fact, in itself, had constituted sufficient grounds for such a far-reaching measure as deprivation of parental authority.
Prior to the criminal proceedings against the applicant, she had not been monitored by a social welfare authority, or warned about her behaviour and the consequences it might entail. And once the applicant’s situation had come to their attention, the competent authorities had made no attempt to provide her with appropriate assistance. There was also no evidence that, in their relevant decisions, the domestic courts had considered any of those factors.
Furthermore, the domestic courts had failed to refer to any particular situations or events where the applicant had left her children unattended, had not provided care for them or had neglected them in any way, let alone endangered their health or life by her actions or inaction. They had merely relied on the applicant’s own statement, made in the context of the criminal proceedings against her, that she had allowed her acquaintances to use her flat for taking drugs, and the oral evidence of a police officer who had stated that the applicant would allow her acquaintances to take drugs in her kitchen, in her children’s presence.
Nevertheless, firstly, it did not follow from the applicant’s statement that she or her acquaintances had ever taken drugs in front of her children. The domestic courts had not explored what the basis for the police officer’s relevant statement had been. Secondly, the applicant, her elder son and her mother had consistently stated that the applicant had not demonstrated her addiction to her family members. The domestic courts had made no attempt to obtain more information in order to clarify the important contradiction with the police officer’s statements.
The applicant had consistently reaffirmed her intention to resolve her drug-addiction problem and, moreover, had taken steps to that end. Yet, the domestic authorities had not sought any independent evidence, such as an assessment by a psychologist, to evaluate the applicant’s emotional maturity and motivation to act as a responsible parent and to resolve her drug-addiction problem. Moreover, the applicant’s arguments and evidence that she had commenced rehabilitation treatment had been ignored by the domestic courts. That was striking in a situation where the applicant’s drug addiction appeared to have been the main, if not the only, ground for depriving her of parental authority.
The domestic courts had relied on the fact that the applicant had been unemployed, but their relevant decisions had not explained how it had affected her ability and capacity to take care of her children. In fact, a report, relied on by the domestic courts, had not revealed any major defects in the living conditions of the applicant’s family; the children had separate sleeping places and there had been sufficient food supplies. Moreover, a following report had clearly shown subsequent improvements, stating, in particular, that the flat had been tidy, cosy and well ventilated. However, no assessment of those changes, in particular whether they could be regarded as a genuine attempt on the part of the applicant to improve her situation after the children’s removal, had been made by the domestic courts.
The domestic authorities had not considered the alternative of applying a less drastic measure and to order restriction rather than deprivation of her parental authority, despite the fact that the applicant had not had a history of neglecting her children. They had not given the applicant any warnings regarding the possible consequences of her allegedly negligent behaviour in respect of her children.
The applicant had consistently expressed her attachment to the children and her wish to maintain her relationship with them. The children had been also deeply attached to her and their maternal grandmother, and the maternal grandmother had been willing to keep the children in her care. Yet, the domestic courts had not given due consideration to any of those aspects. In particular, when choosing the measure to be applied in the applicant’s case, they had not assessed the impact that the children’s separation from their mother and grandmother might have on their well-being.
As a result of the impugned measure, the children had not only been separated from the applicant, their mother, but they themselves had been split up, given that the oldest child had been transferred into his father’s care whereas the two youngest children had been placed in public care.
In sum, the reasons relied on by the domestic courts had been insufficient to justify depriving the applicant of her parental authority over her three children, and placing the two youngest children in public care. The domestic authorities had failed to demonstrate convincingly that, despite the availability of less radical solutions, the impugned measure had constituted the most appropriate option corresponding to the children’s best interests. Notwithstanding the domestic authorities’ margin of appreciation, the interference with the applicant’s family life had therefore not been proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
Conclusion: violation (unanimously).
Article 41: EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
(See also Kutzner v. Germany, 46544/99, 26 February 2002, Information Note 39; Saviny v. Ukraine, 39948/06, 18 December 2008, Information Note 114; M.D. and Others v. Malta, 64791/10, 17 July 2012, Information Note 154; A.K. and L. v. Croatia, 37956/11, 8 January 2013, Information Note 159; R.M.S. v. Spain, 28775/12, 18 June 2013, Information Note 164; S.H. v. Italy, 52557/14, 13 October 2015, Information Note 189; Kocherov and Sergeyeva, 16899/13, 29 March 2016, Information Note 194; S.S. v. Slovenia, 40938/16, 30 October 2018, Information Note 222; Haddad v. Spain, 16572/17, 18 June 2019, Information Note 230; Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC], 37283/13, 10 September 2019, Information Note 232).
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